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REFORMATION IN CORPORATE LAW: EQUAL OPPORTUNITY
MUST BE AFFORDED MINORITY STOCKHOLDERS IN ANY
TRANSACTION IN SHARES BY THOSE IN CONTROL:
JONES v. H. F. AHMANSON
In the recently decided California case, Jones v. H. F. Ahmanson
and Co.,1 Chief Justice Traynor unabashedly adopted a broad new
principle of corporate law for the regulation of majority or controlling
stockholders in any transaction in shares where control of a corporation
is material. Controlling stockholders of a savings and loan association
created a public market for their stock by forming a new corporation,
and were held to have violated a fiduciary standard of "good faith and
inherent fairness" 2 by denying minority shareholders an equal opportunity to exchange their stock on the same basis accorded the controlling
group.' The express adoption of a broad "good faith and inherent
fairness" standard for governing control shareholders signals a radical
innovation in the law of corporations. Although several commentators
have advocated adoption of a rule of equal opportunity in some form,4
never before has it been so frankly recognized by courts as in the "inherent fairness" test of Ahmanson.
In the principal case plaintiff brought an action on behalf of herself
individually and all similarly situated minority stockholders of United
Savings and Loan Association.5 Defendants were United Financial
Corporation6 and fifteen individuals, all of whom were past or present
stockholders, officers or directors of the Association. As a group, defendants controlled United Financial which in turn controlled the Association.
Stock of the Association was not actively traded' because of its high
1. 76 Cal. Rptr. 293 (1969),
[hereinafter cited as Ahnzanson].

rev'd, 81 Cal. Rptr. 592, 460 P.2d 464 (1969)

2. 81 Cal. Rptr. at 602, 460 P.2d at 474.
3. Id. at 606, 460 P.2d at 478.

4. Andrews, The Stockholder's Right to Equal Opportunity in the Sale of Shares,

78 H

v.L. Rzv. 505 (1965); Hill, The Sale of Controlling Shares, 70 HARV. L.

Rtv.

986 (1957); Jennings, Trading in Corporate Control, 44 CAL. L. REv. 1 (1956);
Leech, Transactions in Corporate Control, 104 U. PA. L. Rv. 725 (1956). But see
Javaras, Equal Opportunity in the Sale of Controlling Shares: A Reply to Professor
Andrews, 32 U. CHL L Rxv. 420 (1965).
5. Hereinafter referred to as the Association.
6. United Financial Corporation of California is a Delaware holding company.
81 Cal. Rptr. at 594, 460 P.2d at 466.
7. Transactions which did occur were primarily among existing stockholders and
fourteen of the nineteen defendants comprised 95 per cent of the market prior to 1959.

Id. at 595, 460 P.2d at 467.
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book value,8 the closely held nature of the Association, and the failure of
management to provide investment information and assistance to stockholders, brokers or the public.'
Because of the wide-spread investor interest in savings and loan
stock, particularly in the early 1960's, such stock, when publicly marketed,
had enjoyed a steady increase in price. To capitalize on this situation,
defendants incorporated United Financial and exchanged their Association shares for those of United Financial.1" After the exchange, United
Financial held 85 per cent of the Association's stock, and more than 85
per cent of United Financial's earnings and the book value of its shares
reflected ownership of the Association stock."
Minority stockholders of the Association were not offered an opportunity to exchange their shares. The control group made a public
offering of United Financial shares, 2 and offered to acquire Association
stock from minority stockholders at less than book value, and at prices
lower than those which a derived block of United Financial shares would
have commanded on the market. 3 Moreover, after dividends of seventyfive dollars and fifty-seven dollars for the years of 1959 and 1960
respectively were paid to Association stockholders, that is, during the
period of initial public distribution of United Financial shares, the
Association's president, then a director of both Association and United
Financial, notified the minority stockholders of the Association that, in
accord with pre-1959 practice, only a four dollar per share annual
dividend would be paid in the future. 4
8. The Association retained most of its earnings in tax-free reserves with the
result that book value increased substantially. For example, between 1959 and 1966,

book value rose from $1,131 to $4,143.70 per share. Id. at 594, n.2, 460 P.2d at 466.
9. Id. at 594, 460 P.2d at 466.
10. Defendants received a "derived block" of 250 United Financial shares for each
share of Association stock. Id. at 595, 460 P.2d at 467.
11. Consequently, the former majority stockholders of the Association became
majority stockholders of United Financial and continued to control the Association
through the holding company.
12. In June, 1960, United Financial made its first public offering with a large
portion of the proceeds thus derived distributed as a return of capital to the original

stockholders of United Financial. This distribution was equivalent to $927.50 for each
derived block of shares. 81 Cal. Rptr. at 595, n.6, 460 P.2d at 467.
13. For example, shortly after the first public offering, defendants offered to
purchase Association stock for $1,100 a share. At that time, each share of Association
stock had a book value of $1,411.57 and earnings of $301.15. Also, a derived block of
United Financial shares then commanded $3,700 per block exclusive of the $927.50

return of capital. Id. at 596, 460 P.2d at 468.
14. Id. It is curious that the plaintiff evidently did not allege oppression and
"freeze-out" by the defendants since Traynor fails to address himself to that issue. Yet,
a combination of the disparity between the price offered for Association stock and its
book value, plus the decrease in dividends would seem to indicate a possible freeze-out
situation. Because savings and loan associations do not usually give dividends as a result
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On the basis of these facts plaintiff contended that the defendants
had breached a fiduciary duty owed by the majority or controlling stockholders to the minority by using their power to control the Association for
their own advantage to the detriment of the minority, by creating
United Financial, by establishing a public market for its shares which
rendered Association stock unmarketable except to United Financial, and
then by refusing either to purchase plaintiff's stock at a fair price or exchange the stock on the same basis which was afforded the defendants. 5
Plaintiff was unsuccessful in the District Court of Appeals." While
recognizing that traditional corporate doctrine imposes a fiduciary responsibility with the power of control, the court held that an actionable
violation of these duties would occur only in limited circumstances. It was
found that those circumstances were not present in the instant case even
though the "defendants derived a special benefit in making use of their
power of control,' 7 since actual control of the Association remained with
the defendants by virtue of their control of United Financial. In other
words, plaintiffs were defeated because there had been no transfer of control. Further, the court held that the defendants had "no duty toward Association or its stockholders to provide a favorable market or value for
Association stock."' Consequently, even though the court admitted that
it was an "unpraiseworthy practice to exclude from the money making
scheme . . . [those] stockholders who [had] helped to build up the

Association," 2 plaintiff was not entitled to relief.
Reversing, Justice Traynor noted the

"...

inadequacy of traditional

theories of fiduciary obligation as tests of majority stockholder responsibility to the minority . ."
---particularly the "transfer of control"
doctrine. In times of increasingly complex transactions in the business
and financial community, Justice Traynor concluded that the principle
of good faith and inherent fairness should apply to any ".

.

. transactions

wherein controlling shareholders seek to gain an advantage in the sale or
of special tax exemptions, it is arguable that the decrease was simply motivated by a
desire to bring Association back in line with the rest of the industry. However,

the sudden change under the circumstances plus the position of the Association's
president as an interlocking director might indicate a freeze-out. See generally, F.
O'NEw and J. DERWI- , ExPuLsioN oR OPPREssiON OF BUsiNEss ASsOCIATEs: SQUEEZE
OUTS IN SMALL ENTEIWISES (1961).
15. 81 Cal. Rptr. at 597, 460 P2d at 469.

16. 76 Cal. Rptr. 293.
17. Id. at 298.
18.

Id.

19. Id.
20. Id.
21. 81 Cal. Rptr. at 601, 460 P.2d at 473.

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
transfer or use of their controlling block of shares.
added.)

,,2(Emphasis

The case before us, in which no sale or transfer of actual
control is directly involved, demonstrates that the injury anticipated by these authors can be inflicted with impunity under
the traditional rules and supports our conclusion that the comprehensive rule of good faith and inherent fairness to the
minority in any transaction where control of the corporation
is material properly governs controlling shareholders in this
state.28
The court found that this standard was violated by the defendants.
Besides limiting the benefit derived from creating a public market to
themselves, the defendants' course of action also harmed the minority
stockholders. The successful public marketing of United Financial shares
restricted what market had previously existed for Association stock. The
mere fact that a public market existed for United Financial stock, and one
did not for Association stock would lead investors to prefer the former.2
Further, it became virtually certain that no equivalent market could or
would be created for Association stock, since the defendant had control
of the Association and would not desire to have public trading in Association stock in competiton with United Financial shares.2"
Admittedly, there would be no way the defendants could prevent the
minority stockholders from also forming a holding company and making
their own public offering. But, practically speaking, such a venture would
fail. Investors would be unwilling to buy shares when one holding
company already had control and was offering shares on the public market.
Thus, the court held that when "no market exists, the controlling shareholders may not use their power to control the corporation for the
purpose of promoting a marketing scheme that benefits themselves alone
to the detriment of the minority."2 6
Since resolution of the principal case turned on a determination of
the nature and extent of fiduciary responsibility of majority or controlling
stockholders, a brief examination of traditional doctrine is necessary to
illustrate the novelty of Ahmanson, and to highlight what Justice
22. Id.
23. Id. at 602, 460 P.2d at 474.
24. United Financial shares were registered with the SEC. 81 Cal. Rptr. at
596, 460 P.2d at 468.
25. Id. at 604, 460 P.2d at 476.
26. Id. at 604, 460 P.2d at 476.
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Traynor referred to as the "inadequacy of traditional theories of fiduciary obligation.""

In two situations fiduciary responsibilities traditionally have been
imposed on controlling stockholders: "Conflicts of interest" and "transfer
of control." The former covers all dealings between a corporation and a
controlling stockholder. The imposition of a fiduciary duty on control
stockholders in this situation has been based on two grounds.28 A direct
approach is based on equitable principles that one who holds a position of
superiority and influence over the interests of others is a fiduciary and his
obligation runs to the minority stockholders. 9 In the alternative, if
officers and directors owe fiduciary duties, the controlling stockholder
who dominates the corporation through his influence over directors and
officers is subject to identical responsibility."
The nature of this obligation was described in Pepper v. Litton : '
A director is a fiduciary.., so is a dominant or controlling
stockholder or group of stockholders. .

.

. their dealings with

the corporationare subjected to rigorous scrutiny and where any
of their contracts or engagements with the corporation is challenged, the burden is on the director or stockholder not only
to prove the good faith of the transaction but also to show its
inherent fairness from the viewpoint of the corporation and
those interested therein. 2 (Emphasis added.)
This formulation has generally been accepted as the essence of the
controlling stockholder's fiduciary responsibility. 3 This is the standard
adopted by Justice Traynor. Yet, the factual circumstances in cases cited
by Traynor which adopt this standard and the facts in the principal
case clearly diverge, since the cited cases all involved commercial trans27. Id at 601, 460 P.2d at 473.
28. H. HENN, CORPORATIONS 382 (1961); Note, The Fiduciary Relationt of the
Dominant Shareholder to the Minority Shareholders,9 HASTINGS L.J. 306 (1958).
29. HENN, supra note 27 at 382. An illustration of this approach is Southern
Pacific Co. v. Bogert, 250 U.S. 483, 487-88 (1919): "The majority has the right
to control; but when it does so, it occupies a fiduciary relation toward the minority,
as much so as the corporation itself or its officers and directors."
30. HENx, supra note 27 at 382. An illustration of this approach is Zahn v.
Transamerica Corp., 162 F.2d 36, 46 (3d Cir. 1947) in which the relationship between
the directors and dominant stockholder was characterized by the phrase "puppetpuppeteer. '
31. 308 U.S. 295 (1939).
32. Id. at 306.
33. Zahn v. Transamerica, 162 F.2d 36 (3d Cir. 1947); Lebold v. Inland Steel
Co., 125 F.2d 369, modified 136 F.2d 876 (7th Cir. 1941) ; Burt v. Irvine Co., 237 Cal.
App. 2d 828, 47 Cal. Rptr. 392 (1965); Efron v. Kalmanowitz, 226 Cal. App.
2d 546, 38 Cal. Rptr. 148 (1964); Remillard Brick Co. v. Remillard-Dandini, 109
Cal. App. 2d 405, 241 P.2d 66 (1952).
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actions between the corporation and control persons, not an adjustment
of control itself. In these cases, Burt v. Irvine Co.,34 Efron v. Kalmanowitz,3" and Remillard Brick Co. v. Remillard-Dandini the courts
accepted the traditional position which limits the standard of inherent
fairness to situations of direct dealings between a corporation and majority
stockholder or where the stockholder compels the corporation to take
some official action. Traynor, however, extended this doctrine, applying
the standard to a situation which only involved transactions in shares by
controlling stockholders.
A further ground for distinction of prior case law is that, although
the standard purports to govern controlling stockholders solely because
of their status as dominant stockholders, the defendants in Burt, Efron,
and Remillard were also directors or officers.3 7 In Ahnanson, although
some of the defendants did hold managerial positions and one interlocking
director, the court places virtually no significance on this fact and deals
with the defendants solely as controlling stockholders.
Beyond these distinctions, one must examine the use of a fairness
test. Traditionally, courts have found a transaction fair if it has the
"earmarks of an arm's length bargain, '"38 if it is not one-sided or startling," or if the stockholders lose nothing.4" In support of Traynor's
expansion, however, it seems that more is required to determine fairness.
A corporation is owned by all of its stockholders. It is to be operated for
their benefit. Therefore, in deciding if a transaction is "fair," the appropriate inquiry should be whether or not the minority stockholders are
obtaining the best deal possible." Justice Traynor states that controlling
shareholders must use their power of control to benefit "all shareholders
proportionately."4 2 Thus, under the circumstances present in Ahmanson,
for the minority to benefit proportionately they should have had an equal
opportunity to exchange their shares.
"Transfer of control" is the second major area of corporate law
34. 237 Cal. App. 2d 828, 47 Cal. Rptr. 392 (1965).
35. 226 Cal. App. 2d 546, 38 Cal. Rptr. 148 (1964).
36. 109 Cal. App. 2d 405, 241 P.2d 66 (1952).
37. In Burt and Remillard, the stockholders were also directors. In Efron, the
defendant was a stockholder-president.
38. Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. at 306, 307 (1959).
39. Globe Woolen v. Utica Gas and Electric Co., 224 N.Y. 483, 491, 121 N.E.
378, 380 (1918).
40. Case v. New York Central Railroad Co. 15 N.Y.2d 150, 157-58, 256 N.Y.S.
2d 607, 612, 204 N.E.2d 643, 647 (1965).
41. See, 9 HASTINGS L.J., supra note 28 at 313 where the author suggests a
similar test of fairness by stating: ". . . the community of interest of all the shareholders imposes upon those in control the obligation to produce the most that can be
obtained for all."
42. 81 Cal. Rptr. at 599, 360 P.2d at 471.
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where some form of fiduciary responsibility has been imposed on controlling stockholders in relation to the minority. Except in the case of
Ahmanson few restrictions have been placed on the free transferability of
control stock, since the stock was regarded as the private property of the
control person,4" and transferability in such cases was deemed a stimulus
to the economy.4" As a result the courts have resisted predicating liability
on so broad a fairness test as that adopted by Traynor. Those limitations
which were imposed in the transfer of control situation involved gross
profit or unconscionable conduct as in cases of sale of corporate office,4"
looting,4" abuse of a corporate opportunity,4 payment of a disguised
premium for corporate product,48 sale of a corporate asset.49 Justice
Traynor clearly moves beyond these situations and establishes a general
doctrine which governs majority or controlling shareholders in any
transactions in shares.
The application of such a doctine in the principal case raises several
questions. First, what sort of obligations does a standard of inherent
fairness impose, what is their scope, and when are they imposed? Must
minority stockholders always be offered an opportunity to partake in a
transaction in shares by controlling or majority stockholders? Secondly,
can controlling shares ever be sold for a premium? Finally, what effect will
7 WES. RFSERV L. REV. infra note 44 at 476.
44. Andrews, The Stockholder's Right to Equal Opportunity in the Sale of
43.

Shares, 78 HARv. L. REv. 505 (1965); Jennings, Trading i Corporate Control, 44
CAL. L. REv. 1 (1956) ; Note, Sales of Corporate Control and the Theory of Overkill,
31 U. CH. L. REv. 725 (1964); Note, The Fiduciary Duty of Controlling Shareholders, 7 WEs. RESERVE L. REV. 467 (1956).
45. Porter v. Healy, 244 Pa. 427, 91 A. 428 (1918), is the clearest example of
a sale of corporate office. Liability turns on whether a director or officer is being paid
by an outsider to take some official action to acquire additional shares, with the
consideration being a secret side payment. The circumstances usually reveal misrepresentation or non-disclosure.
46. Gerdes v. Reynolds, 28 N.Y.S.2d 622 (1941). This case involved a sale of
stock at such an exorbitant price as to involve sale of corporate office followed by
looting of the corporate assets.
47. The theory of corporate opportunity is best illustrated by the case of Commonwealth Title Ins. and Trust Co. v. Seltzer, 227 Pa. 410, 76 A. 77 (1910). Liability
was predicated on the ground that the president-stockholder diverted a corporate
opportunity to sell directly to the purchaser.
48. The theory of disguised premium for the corporation's product is one way
to interpret the famous case Perman v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir. 1955). The
court based liability on the ground that the purchaser paid for control in order to get
the product, therefore the premium should have gone to the corporation or all the
stockholders.
49. The corporate asset theory is another way to read Perlman. This theory was
first advanced by A. BERLE AND G. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE
PROPERTY 244 (1932). Essentially the theory says that stock which carries control and
sells at a premium is selling a corporate asset: the power to control gives the stock
the premium since one who has voting control also has control of the corporate
assets. Thus, the premium always belongs to the corporation.
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the adoption of an equal opportunity rule have on the marketability of
controlling shares? Will the rule established by Justice Traynor prevent
any "beneficial" transfers of control and thus be detrimental to the
economy? What should be the policy in this area?
In deciding how far Justice Traynor goes, it is possible to read the
opinion narrowly and argue that there has been no drastic change.
Initially it seems that Traynor has done nothing more than to hold that
when a transaction in shares by majority or controlling stockholders is
questioned by the minority, the burden of proof is shifted to the controlling group to defend the transaction and to show good faith and
inherent fairness. This interpretion is supported by the opinion's use"0
of Pepper v. Litton, which, while establishing a standard of inherent
fairness, places the burden of proof on the controlling stockholder." So
read, the rule of Ahmanson would not require an equal opportunity to
participate in all transfer of control situations. Further, the egregious
set of circumstances which gave rise to Ahmanson severely limits the
precedential value of this holding. In any future case, given the complexity of corporate transactions today, controlling shareholders should
have little difficulty in finding a rational justification for their conduct
and so meet the burden of inherent fairness.
On the other hand, several factors warrant a broader reading of
Justice Traynor's opinion. He establishes guidelines for determining
what is inherent fairness. In deciding if there has been a duty breached,
the test is whether there has been a significant worsening of the minority's
position or a significant betterment of the controlling stockholders'
position. 2 If there will be significant damage to the minority, then the
controlling shareholders must, at a minimum, make an offer to the
minority inviting them to participate in the transaction on the same basis
as that afforded the controlling stockholders." Thus, in the principal
case, the defendants breached their fiduciary duty because they obtained a
benefit (creation of a market for their shares) not available to all the
stockholders, 4 to the detriment of the minority (by the foreclosure of a
potential public market for Association shares)."
Even though equal opportunity is not a per se rule but merely an
aspect of inherent fairness, Traynor states that equal opportunity alone
does not relieve one of proving inherent fairness:
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

81 Cal. Rptr. at 599, 460 P.2d at 471.
308 U.S. at 306, 307.
See 81 Cal. Rptr. at 601, 602, 604, 606, 460 P.2d at 473, 474, 476, 478.
Id. at 603, 460 P.2d at 475.
Id. at 604, 460 P.2d at 476.

55. Id. at 604, 606, 460 P.2d at 476, 478.
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Had defendants afforded the minority an opportunity to exchange their stock on the same basis or offered to purchase
them at a price arrived at by independent appraisal, their
burden of establishing good faith and inherent fairness would
have been much less."
The foregoing demonstrates that Traynor's application of a standard of
good faith and inherent fairness entails much more than a shift in the
burden of proof.57
Traynor's decision has additional significance in the question of
whether controlling shares can ever be sold for a premium. Traynor's
rule appears not to require any premium: all that is called for is a
significant detriment to the minority 8 or a significant benefit to the
controlling stockholders.59 Consequently, since receipt of a premium is
presumably a significant benefit, Traynor's rule does suggest that liability
would be imposed any time a sale of controlling shares involved a
premium, unless minority stockholders were also given an opportunity to
sell at the same price.
Adoption of this reading of Ahmanson seriously brings into question the status of traditional cases holding that one can pay more for
control if control was all that had been sought.6" However, one might distingnish Ahmanson by suggesting that Traynor intended to cover the
peculiarities of a situation involving a holding company and its manipulations to obtain a benefit, rather than a straight transfer of control
situation where the affirmative action in procurring such a transaction is
ordinarily not originated by the controlling stockholder. It is arguable
that the opinion meant to cover both situations by failing to expressly
draw the distinction and consistently reiterating that the standard of
inherent fairness would apply to any transactions "wherein controlling
shareholders seek to gain an advantage in the sale or transfer or use of
their controlling block of shares."'" Furthermore, it is suggested that
Traynor's rule should cover both situations. Any distinction would be
56. Id. at 604, 460 P.2d at 476.
57. Moreover, additional support for the contention that Traynor's test extends
beyond a rule of equal opportunity is his statement that any use to which controlling

stockholders put their power to control must benefit "all shareholders proportionately."
81 Cal. Rptr. at 599, 460 P.2d at 471.
58. Which in this instance was not a premium but the destruction of a potential
public market for Association shares and the exclusion of the minority from the new
market created by the defendants.
59. See supra note 52 and text accompanying.
60. A classic case inthis area is Essex Universal Corp. v.Yates, 305 F.2d
572 (2d Cir. 1962).
61. 81 Cal. Rptr. at 601, 460 P.2d at 473.
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artificial or off point if one's concern is with protecting minority stockholders by imposing responsibility upon those with whom the power of
control resides.
Another aspect of Ahmanson is the extension of appraisal rights
to cover the plaintiffs. Traynor views the transfer in control62 as accomplishing a fundamental corporate change with respect to the minority:
control of a closely held association became an asset of a publicly held
holding company with the position of the minority thereby drastically
changed.6" Accordingly, relying on the case of Farris v. Glen Alden
Corp."' as support for the extension of appraisal rights beyond the
statutory merger situation, Traynor concludes that the plaintiff should
have been entitled to a right of appraisal.
Traynor's conclusion that a drastic corporate change took place is not
unassailable. Minority stockholders suffered no dilution in their voting
power or equity in the Association. No fundamental changes occurred in
the goals of the corporation by the mere formation of the holding company, since the control group remained the same. Moreover, Farris v.
Glen Alden is easily distinguishable, since in that case a sale of assets was
followed by dissolution, whereas in Ahmanson there was a continuation
of the Association.
Greater support for Traynor's grant of appraisal rights is found in
an article by Professor Eisenberg. 5 Generally, Professor Eisenberg
examines a broad variety of financing methods in the face of archaic
corporate law and suggests that appraisal rights should cover situations
involving a permanent and substantial economic corporate reorganization.66 Although Traynor relies essentially on this conception of fundamental corporate change, he departs from Eisenberg to the extent that
Eisenberg suggested statutory amendment as the appropriate remedy.
Also of particular interest in extending appraisal rights to situations of
fundamental corporate change is that Traynor goes in the opposite
62. See note 43 supra and text accompanying.
63.
His practical ability to influence corporate decision-making was
diminished substantially when control was transferred to a publicly held
corporation that was in turn controlled by the owners of more than 750,000
shares. The future business goals of the Association could reasonably be
expected to reflect the needs and interest of the holding company rather
than the aims of the Association stockholders thereafter. In short, the enterprise into whij- the minority stockholders were now locked was not that in
which they had invested.

81 Cal. Rptr. at 605, 460 P.2d at 477.
64. 393 Pa. 427, 143 A.2d 25 (1958).
65. Eisenberg, The Legal Roles of Shareholders and Management in Modern
CorporateDecisioninaking,57 CAL. L REv. 1 (1969).

66. Id. at 118.
67. Id. at 146, 147.
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direction of Professor Manning, seeming to have relied partly on Professsor Eisenberg's article.8 Eisenberg not only attacks the Manning thesis 9
that appraisal rights should be abolished entirely, but also advocates
extention of the right. He feels extension is desirable as a matter of policy
because it prevents a stockholder from being forced into an enterprise in
which he had not originally invested and serves to check unfairness in
major corporate reorganizations."0 It is possible that Traynor used
appraisal merely as a means of determining the appropriate measure of
damages. The breadth of the argument, however, §uggests an attempt to
bolster the arsensal of the minority shareholder.
Any evaluation of justice Traynor's use of a rule of equal opportunity
necessitates a consideration as to what the policy should be regarding
transactions in shares and an examination of the possible ramifications
such a rule will have on the marketability of controlling shares.
One objection to a rule calling for equal opportunity any time controlling shares are sold for a premium is the traditional doctrine that one
should have the "unfettered freedom to transfer shares,"'" as an attribute
of property rights in stock. Yet several commentators have argued that
even though a controlling stockholder may set his price, it does not follow
that he should be able to sell on terms not generally available to other
stockholders."2 When a controlling stockholder sells at a premium he is
making a unilateral determination that the corporation should gamble on
its future prosperity, by his withdrawal, without consulting the remaining
stockholders who will be subject to this risk."3 Furthermore, it has been
argued that profits from stock sales ought to be regarded as profits of
the enterprise and subject to distribution among stockholders as much as
profits realized through corporate action.74
Further, it has been argued that a rule of equal opportunity would
restrict "beneficial" transfers of control :

".

.

. there are greater risks

[in] restraining sales of controlling shares than [in] permitting new
blood to enter the corporation br purchase of control."7 " This suggestion
68. Id.
69. Manning, The Shareholder's Appraisal Remedy: An Essay for Frank Coker,
72 YALE L.J. 223 (1962).
70. See Eisenberg, 57 CAL. L. REv., supra note 65.
71. Javaras, Equal Opportunity in the Sale of Controlling Shares: A Reply to
ProfessorAndrews, 32 U. CHl. L. Rav. 420 (1965) ; Note, 31 U. CHI. L. Rav., supra note
44.
72. Andrews, 78 HARv. L REv., supra note 44 at 506.
73. Leech, Transactionsin CorporateControl, 104 U. PA. L. Rav. 725, 838 (1956).
74. Andrews, 78 HARV. L. PEv., supra note 44 at 521.
75. Javaras, 32 U. Cl. L. REv., supra note 71; Note. 31 U. Ca. L. R., supra
note 44.
76. Leech, 104 U. PA. L. REv., supra note 73 at 838.
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is based on the notion that control persons would be unwilling to sell
without a premium and that the purchaser of control might not be willing
to extend his offer to all stockholders, if only on account of financing
problems. However, in practice, the validity of this point remains to be
shown. Perhaps some empirical analysis would be in order on this point
to resolve the dispute.
While Ahmanson furnishes strong encouragement to advocates of
an equal opportunity rule, the extreme nature of its facts may color its
value as precedent; at least, however, Traynor's opinion is a frank
recognition that law which would have permitted no remedy in such
situation is in need of searching examination by the courts.
MICHAEL

D. O'CoqtNOR

